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THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEET-
ING OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSO-
CIATION, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., DECEMBER
27, 28 AND 29, 1905.
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY.
The fourteenth annual meeting of the American Psychological
Association was held at Harvard University, Cambridge', Mass., on
Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, December 27, 28 and 29, 1905, in
affiliation with the American Philosophical Association. About one
hundred members of the two associations, including sixty-five belong-
ing to the Psychological Association, were in attendance at the various
sessions, some of which also attracted a large number of outsiders.
Most of the members were accommodated in dormitory rooms, thanks
to the courtesy of Harvard and Radcliffe students.
All the sessions were held in Emerson Hall, the new building
devoted to philosophy, psychology, and sociology. To signalize the
formal opening of this building, special exercises were held on the
afternoon of Wednesday, December 27, Professor Miinsterberg pre-
siding. Addresses were made by President Eliot and Dr. Edward
Waldo Emerson. These exercises were immediately followed by a
joint discussion with the American Philosophical Association on ' The
Affiliation of Psychology with Philosophy and with the Natural
Sciences,' with Professor Dewey, President of the Philosophical Asso-
ciation, in the chair. President Calkins was in the chair at all the
other sessions of the Association. On Thursday afternoon, immedi-
diately following the business meeting, the Association went into con-
ference on the subjects of ' Cooperation between Laboratories and
Departments of Different Institutions' and ' Elementary Instruction
in Psychology.' Papers were grouped and distributed among the
other sessions, so far as possible, with a view to unifying their several
programs. On Wednesday morning most of the papers were on
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comparative and abnormal psychology. Thursday morning was given
up to a set discussion on the ' The Definition of Feeling,' followed by
other papers on general psychology. At twelve o'clock Professor
Wilhelm Ostwald addressed the Association, by invitation, on ' Psy-
chical Energy.' The sessions of Friday were devoted to the section
of experimental psychology, the papers of the morning dealing with
related problems in vision, those of the afternoon being of a miscel-
laneous character. At the close of the formal program there followed
an inspection of the new Harvard Laboratory and the demonstration
of apparatus used in current researches.
The members of the Association were hospitably entertained at
luncheon by the Harvard Corporation at the Harvard Union on
Wednesday at i o'clock, and at a reception tendered by Professor and
Mrs. Miinsterberg at their home immediately after the address of the
President on Wednesday evening. Most of the members of the Asso-
ciation heard the presidential address before the Philosophical Asso-
ciation on Thursday evening, after which a joint smoker of the two
Associations was held at the Harvard Union. Visits were made to
Wellesley College, the McLean Hospital, and the Massachusetts Insti-
tute for Feeble Minded, by invitation of these institutions.
At the regular business meeting held on December 28, the fol-
lowing was transacted : Election of officers for 1906 : President, Pro-
fessor James Rowland Angell, University of Chicago; Members of
the Council to serve three years, Professor Mary Whiton Calkins,
Wellesley College, and Professor C. E. Seashore, University of Iowa.
The following new members were elected : Dr. Elizabeth Kemper
Adams, Smith College; Professor Bird Thomas Baldwin, West
Chester Normal School, Pa.; Dr. J. Carleton Bell, Wellesley College ;
Mr. Edward Herbert Cameron, Yale University; Mr. Donald John
Cowling, Yale University; Professor Kate Gordon, Mt. Holyoke
College; Professor Edmund B. Huey, Western University of Penn-
sylvania ; Professor Charles Hughes Johnston, State Normal School,
East Stroudsburg, Pa.; Dr. Irving King, Pratt Institute; Dr. Adolf
Meyer, New York State Pathological Institute; Dr. Noami Nors-
•worthy, Teacher's College; Mr. James P. Porter, Clark College; Dr.
Morton Prince, Tufts College Medical School; Miss Margaret S.
Pritchard, Philadelphia Normal School; Dr. James J. Putnam,
. Harvard Medical School; Dr. Eleanor Harris Rowland, Mt. Holyoke
• College; Professor Henry A. Ruger, Colorado College; Dr. Boris
1 Sidis, Brookline, Mass.; Dr. Theodate L. Smith, Clark University;
JDr. Edward G. Spaulding, Princeton University; Professor Herman
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Campbell Stevens, University of Washington; Professor Herbert
Stotesbury, Temple College.
The Secretary reported on behalf of the Council that an invitation
from the University of Illinois to the installation of President Edmund
Janes James on October 17, iS and 19, 1905, had been accepted, and
that by request of the Council Professors Cattell and Jastrow repre-
sented the Association.
Upon recommendation of the Council, it was voted to amend
Article IV. of the Constitution to read as follows: "Annual sub-
scription. — The annual subscription shall be one dollar in advance."
An affirmative vote having been polled at two successive meetings,
the Constitution now stands amended as above.
Upon recommendation of the Council, it was voted to accept the
invitation of Columbia University to hold the next annual meeting in
New York, in affiliation with the American Association for the
Advancement of Science and the American Society of Naturalists,
with the understanding that the American Philosophical Association
decide to meet at the same time and place, power being given to the
Council to arrange otherwise in case circumstances should arise to
make a change of plan desirable.
The Council presented a report from the Committee on Bibliog-
raphy, which appears below, and recommended that the Committee
be discharged with the thanks of the Association for its services and
that no action be taken until after the appearance of Dr. Rand's bibli-
ography. On motion, this recommendation was amended to the effect
that the Council be instructed to recommend action after an examina-
tion of Dr. Rand's bibliography, and was adopted as amended.
Upon recommendation of the Council, it was voted to instruct the
new Council to consider the whole question of the guardianship and
utilization of the Association's accumulated fund and to report upon
the same at the next annual meeting.
Upon motion of Professor Thorndike, it was voted that the Council
be authorized, at its discretion, to allow the Secretary traveling and
other expenses incident to the arrangement of the program and the
preparations for the meetings.
A vote of thanks was extended to the authorities of Harvard Uni-
versity and especially to the members of the Department of Philosophy
for the courtesy and generous hospitality shown to the Association.
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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY.
T-o the American Psychological Association:
Your Bibliographical Committee would respectfully report that
on the general questions committed to them they have nothing to add
to what was contained in their report to the St. Louis meeting, 1903,
a copy of which is appended.1
On the question of expense, with regard to which the Association
requested further information at its Philadelphia meeting last year, the
committee would report as follows :
The committee knows of no way of determining the expense ex-
actly in advance of the actual preparation of the bibliography. From
the best data in their possession they estimate the expense as follows:
Purchase of suitable portions of Prof. Leuba's bibli-
ography $ 150.00
Clerical work and cards for the 6,000 or 7,000 titles nec-
essary to complete the bibliography, estimated to
include a total of about 12,000^15,000 titles 150.00
Salary of the executive agent recommended in the St.
Louis report 1,000.00
Printing and publishing an edition of 500 copies in the
style of the ' Psychological Index'2 1,020.00—1275
Total $2,320.00—2575
Respectfully submitted,
The Committee on Bibliography,
Bv E. C. SANFORD, Chairman.
R E P O R T OF T H E T R E A S U R E R F O R 1905.
DR.
To receipts from retiring Treasurer $2,667.21
Dues from members 216.30
Total {2,883.51
1
 This report to the St. Louis meeting, 1903, -was published in full in the
Proceedings of that meeting (this BTJIAETIN, February 10, 1904), and is not
here reproduced.
2
 This estimate is given at the request of the Association ; the committee in
an earlier report advised against immediate printing of the bibliography. Vide
Report of 1902.
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CR.
By expenditures for printing (including printed
stationery) $ 50.80
Postage and special stationery 20.45
Clerical assistance 38.64
Proceedings 6.64
Smoker at Philadelphia, 1904 30.90
Total 147.43
2,736.08
Accumulated interests on deposits, July 1, 1905 32.74
Total $2,768.82
Audited by the Council.
WM. HARPER DAVIS,
Secretary and Treasurer.
ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS.
A Reconciliation of Structural and Functional Psychology. Presi-
dent's Address. By MARY WHITON CALKINS.
Psychology is the study of the conscious self. Not the psychic
event — the mental process or idea — is the basal fact of psychology
but the self from which every psychic event is a mere abstraction. This
self of the psychologist must be sharply distinguished, first, from the
philosopher's self, the object of metaphysical study; second, from the
biologist's self, the animal body which ' has consciousness,' and, finally,
from the sociologist's self, the self regarded as a member of a com-
munity.
The scientific study of the conscious self involves two essential pro-
cedures : First, the analysis of its consciousness into structural ele-
ments, sensational, affective and the like, and, second, the enumeration
and classification of its relations with its environment, that is, with
other selves and with objects. The first of these procedures is the dis-
tinctive feature of structural psychology ; the second is the fundamen-
tal motive of functional psychology. The essentials both of structural
and of functional psychology are thus combined in psychology as study
of a self; for this self is both a complex of elemental experiences and a
complex of relationships to its environment. (To appear in full in the
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW for March.)
The Relations of Muscular Activity to the Mental Process. By
GEORGE V. N. DEARBORN.
While denying the hereditary, ex cathedra supposition that the
brain is the sole correlate of the mind, the present notes suggest only
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some of the claims of muscular protoplasm for consideration as repre-
senting a part of the mental process. The burden of proof rests upon
those who limit the physical basis of consciousness to the nervous sys-
tem, for unless consciousness is of the nature of a secretion such a
view is unwarranted.
The a priori criteria of correlation are not very clear. But, if intri-
cacy of structure, subtlety of metabolism, or variety of forms of energy
be the criterion, form of protoplasm excels muscle as a correlate. A
criterion perhaps more likely is motion, one of the basal characters of
life in both its psychic and somatic aspects. It is certain that muscle
represents inherent molar movements better than any other tissue and
molecular motion at least as well as any. Recent physiological research
shows that muscle tonus (a partial balancing of varying contractions)
pervades all muscle always. From the other side psychology in its
theory of feeling demonstrates both the universality of muscular activity
and the probable continuity of affective tone.
Muscles are not separate organs for the most part, but probably a
nearly continuous vitally active tissue pervading practically the whole
body and forming half its mass. There are more than six hundred ' vol-
untary ' muscles, and muscle of a reflex sort is all over the rest of the
body save in the bones, the nervous system, and the alveoli of glands.
' Voluntary' muscles serve relatively new combinations of movement,
while the ' reflex' muscles assist the vegetative movements. Both alike,
however, are served by myriads of afferent and efferent neural end-
organs and thus share alike in the highly complex ' motor' mechanism
of the organism, correlate of the fusion-current of consciousness. But
these varied end-organs serve the autonomous muscle-protoplasm;
for the balance of recent evidence, histologic and physiologic, goes to
prove both the unity and the autonomy of muscle tissue.
All these properties of muscle combine to help supply the criteria
of psycho-physical correlation lacking in the cerebral cortex and also
simplify the theory of bodily movement.
Hoiu can the Relation of the Conscious to the Subconcious be Best
Conceived? By IRVING KING.
This paper criticises the common mode of conceiving conscious-
ness after the analogy of the visual field. As against this view it is
here suggested that consciousness be conceived as a point, correlated
not with neural activity, per se, but with a certain organization of
neural processes. The point of consciousness is modified by outlying
neural processes as well as those most directly concerned in the adjust-
ment in progress. This ' point' is also self-consciousness.
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From the standpoint here proposed the subconscious is not dim
consciousness, but outlying neural processes and dispositions which in
a vague way affect the movement of the central organization of neural
processes with which the point of consciousness is correlated. (This
paper appeared in full in the PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, for January,
1906, under the title, 'The Problem of the Subconscious.')
The Senses and Intelligence of the Japanese Dancing Mouse, with
Demonstrations. By ROBERT M. YERKES.
Further Study of the English Sparrow and other Birds. By J. P.
PORTER.
A vesper sparrow, a cow-bird, four English sparrows, and two
pigeons have been made the subjects of experimentation. All except
the pigeons, which were not tried with this apparatus, learn a simple
maze in from twenty to thirty trials. Ten memory tests thirty days
later with no intervening tests show a surprising good memory. A
reversal of the maze gives rise to much interference during the first
tests, but this is quickly overcome. In all these tests the vesper sparrow
shows least ability to profit by experience. The English sparrows are
little, if at all, superior to the cow-bird.
The results with a food-box opened by pulling or pushing any one
of four strings just to the left of the door indicate that the cow-bird, a
male dovecot pigeon and a female passenger pigeon learn in much the
same way, if not quite so rapidly, as the English sparrows. There
are more failures later in the series, especially for the male pigeon.
Memory tests thirty days later give much the same results as before, a
second memory series one hundred and twenty days later for the cow-
bird and one hundred and forty days for the male pigeon indicate that
much more is forgotten than during the shorter interval. The lapse
of time leads to a reversion to an earlier method of opening the door.
The cow-bird learns to distinguish between the designs and colors
used with the English sparrow in an earlier study (reported at the St.
Louis Meeting of the Association and published in Am. Jour. Psych.,
July, 1904). With the more difficult designs the sparrow is better.
With the colors there is little difference. Some tests with forms
indicate that the cow-bird was learning the triangular-shaped box.
My earlier results with the English sparrow were negative.
The English sparrow when observed in confinement with the above
named birds or out-of-doors has shown itself more capable of fear,
courage or boldness, caution and independent action. It is more of
a leader, more persistent, and more active. The cow-bird at times is.
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as war}' but not so bold. The pigeons are very timid, have a keen
sense of vision, and seem easily distracted. The vesper sparrow has
less fear, and seems much more trustful than her nearer relative.
The Habits and Instincts of Spiders, Genera Argiope and Epeira.
By J. P. PORTER.
The spiders, Ej>eira trifolium, sclopetaria, strix, patagiata,
corticaria, and angulata, and Argiope transversa and riparia have
been studied. Most of these have been observed both in and out of
doors.
All have shown great differences in degree of development and
some in color markings, especially E. trifolium. There are great
variations in the selection of a place for the web and, in the case of
those that build one, of the nest; also in the material for a nest. Ob-
servation of the laying of foundation lines for the web shows that with
A. transversa and E. trifolium it is a ' trial and error' affair. In the
actual making of the web there is much variation due in part to the
site chosen. Any part may be made stronger if need be. Webs may
vary from the normal slant, there may be more spirals above than be-
low the center, which is equivalent to turning the web upside down,
very often the ' winding stair' may be partly or wholly omitted, the
center of the web left undarned, the side-guards or screens, one or
both, left off. Counts of elements of five different parts of the web
(the supports, radii, outer spirals above, and below, and the inner
spirals) covering many individual webs all give a very large ' mean
variation' and 'probable error.' Since the young spin such perfect
. webs, veiy often more perfect than those of the old, it would seem
best to look upon these variations as lying within the possibilities of
instinct. However, further observations covering the complete life
cycle of the same individuals are very desirable. The ' coefficient of
variability' is very large even for webs spun in places of the spiders'
own choice. Some of these variations are perhaps marked enough to
constitute the starting points of new habits and thus possibly of new
species.
The first appearance of light in the morning seems to be the
stimulus which sets A. riparia and transversa and E. trifolium to
spinning. Nightfall is the time for old E. stlopetaria and angulata.
The young of these spin at almost any time of day.
The feeding habits show adaptation to kind of prey. There is
some evidence of intelligent adaptation to what is not good for food.
The so-called ' feigning instinct' is not a ' kataplectic' state and
seems to be controlled. The instinct to vibrate the web is strongest in
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the Argiope. They give a rhythmic swing to the web when dis-
turbed. This led to a test of their range of attentive vision, which is
very probably ten to twelve times greater immediately after they have
been disturbed than when at rest.
Spiders behave in a manner which in higher animals would be
credited to fear, anger, courage, attachment to web, nest, cocoon or
young. Their sexual feelings are very strong. They seem to be
cautious and persevering. The females seem to show powers of ex-
pectant attention and voluntary control.
The courtship or the approach of the male to the female is made
up of a number of rather definite steps. The male profits by the
helplessness of the female during moulting, and copulation occurs
then. The process is variable.
There would, therefore, seem to be much in spider habits and in-
stincts to remind us of Loeb's tropisms, yet a sufficiently plastic basis
for adaptations, some of which fall within the possibilities of instinct,
while others, perhaps, are cases of intelligent control.
Variations in the Nests of a Spider, with a Comment on the Meas-
urement of the Variability of Instinct. By W M . HARPER
DAVIS.
A series of 222 nests of another species of spider, which binds grass
or sedge blades in a peculiar fashion to form boxes for the protection
of its eggs, was exhibited and a preliminary report on the variations
and their causes was presented. Marked individual differences, in-
cluding several anomalous types, appear, which probably represent
(apart from accidental variations due to mechanical conditions) both
variations in instinct and ingenious ' accommodations' to unusual condi-
tions. Variations in length of the regular 'modal' forms conform closely
in their distribution to the normal curve of frequency. In spite of the
undoubted presence, in this case, of numerous factors which it is dif-
ficult to eliminate, it is thought that an objective measurement of the
variability of instincts may be possible.
The Ant-queen as a Psychological Study. By WILLIAM MORTON
W H E E L E R . (This paper will appear in full in an early number
of the Popular Sciente Monthly.')
Conscious Experiences and the Somatic Group of Senses. By
"EDWARD COWLES.
This refers to the physiological reactio'ns of the body whose influ-
ences are brought to bear upon conscious experience through the group
of senses which may be designated as somatic. In Professor San-
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ford's address to this Association in 1902 on the relation of psychology
and physics he describes the conscious experiences that may be called
physical phenomena; these belong chiefly to the senses that mediate
the ' life of relation' with the world outside of our own bodies, —the
' physical group of senses.' The method of psychology includes the
foregoing and deals with all others that belong to inner experiences.
This conception of a relation between conscious experiences and outer
physical phenomena implies an organism, with its special ' physical
group of senses' in touch with the outer contacts, acting as a medium
of transmission between the two. This suggests that this medium
may be conceived as forming also a somatic group of senses in the
paths of communication, which adds to its reports of contacts with the
other ' life of relation ' a multitude of returns, with all their variations,
from its own physical workings; we do not recognize for the most part
the sources of these sensations, whether of well-being or ill-being, yet
they have a controlling influence upon our minds. Thus three group-
ings are indicated of the functions of the sensory mechanisms of con-
scious experience : (1) the physical group of senses of the outer ' life
of relation'; (2) the somatic group of senses of the inner life, —our
conscious experiences of our own bodies; (3) the central psychical
life, which includes both of the other groups besides those belonging
distinctly to the mental life.
The interest of this to psychiatry is that comparatively little atten
tion has been given to this inner sensory field; yet here are the condi-
tions and the very material of bodily and mental stimulations and sen-
sations with which the mental work is done. These explaining
principles have been almost wholly omitted from the accepted formulas
of the conceptions of modern advanced psychiatry, which has chieflv
concerned itself with the motor aspects of mental life and expression.
These physiological references are needed to explain many of the
symptoms of the psychoses and should have their full value in the
formulation of the principles of mental physiology and psychiatry.
The Nature of Hypnotic and Post-hypnotic Hallucinations. By
BORIS SIDIS.
Hypnotic and post-hypnotic hallucinations have been studied more
for amusement than for scientific analysis. The validity of the hyp-
notic hallucination has passed unchallanged, because of the doubtful
assumption of the central origin of hallucinations, an assumption cur-
rent among psychologists and especially among psychiatrists who still
pin their faith to ' images and idols' and accept uncritically the intro-
spective account of the insane and dements, as to the nature of their
I
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hallucinations. The central origin of hallucinations is highly doubt-
ful, and the hypnotic hallucination certainly does not support it.
Workers in hypnosis have too readily, eagerly and credulously ac-
accepted the suggestions of their subjects. Although the introspec-
tive account of hypnotic subjects is more valid and trustworthy than
that of the insane or of dements, still it should be taken guardedly and
should certainly not be accepted uncritically on its face value. Ex-
periments and observations carried out by the writer on many sub-
jects tend to prove that hypnotic hallucinations are neither of periph-
eral nor of the alleged ' central' origin, but are essentially spurious
in their character. The so-called hypnotic or post-hypnotic halluci-
nation is really not experienced by the subject. The hypnotic or
post-hypnotic hallucination is not a hallucination, but a delusion.
(This paper is to appear in full in the forthcoming number of the
Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*)
The Psychology of Sudden Conversion. By MORTON PRINCE.
The psychology of sudden conversion is not always the same.
This study was, therefore, limited to a particular type of cases which
might be exemplified by the case of Ratisbonne, described by William
James in his Varieties of Religious Experience. According to
James' theory of sudden conversion, there has been going on for some
time previous to the crisis, in the ultramarginal or subconscious field
of thought, an incubation of motives deposited by the experiences of
life. Finally, when these motives have come to maturity, they burst
forth, like a flower, into the conscious life of the individual.
Thus far no one has demonstrated, experimentally or otherwise,
the previous existence of such subconscious ideas in any specific case.
The value of the reader's observation lay in the fact that he had had
an opportunity to examine experimentally in hypnosis the antecedent
content of consciousness in an instance of sudden ecstasy with change
of view and belief. The whole, although not of a religious nature,
was in every other way (that is, in principle) identical with religious
conversion of the type in question. Indeed, religious ideas played a
prominent part in the mental content. The subject had betaken her-
self to church, thinking that through self-communing and prayer she
might find some way out of her difficulties. As she communed with
herself, still in a condition of self-despair and hopelessness, suddenly
all became changed and she was filled with a great emotion of joyous-
ness and of well-being, etc.; in other words, a condition of ecstasy
developed, with a belief in her own miraculous cure and that she had
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had a visitation. With this belief, exalted religious feelings became
mingled.
For purposes of examination the subject in the case reported was
put into two different hypnotic states, both able to give an intel-
ligent account of what had happened and was unknown to the subject.
The first hypnotic state was able to give only a partial account of
what happened in the church and of the content of the subject's mind.
The second hypnotic state was able to give a very full account.
In this case, of which a full account has been reserved for the au-
thor's work, The Dissociation of a Personality, there was then no
incubation or flowering of subconscious ideas, but simply emotions of
the moment, which, developing in a trance state and persisting after
waking as a state of exaltation, had suggested the beliefs which took
possession of her mind. The part played by the subconscious mind
consisted in furnishing emotions rather than ideas.
Many of the cases of sudden conversion recorded in literature are
of this type in that the crisis consisted of a trance-like or hypnoid
condition into which the subject fell. The state of ecstasy followed
this trance condition, and probably had the same psychological mechan-
ism. St. Paul's conversion was probably of this type.
General Discussion on the Affiliation of Psychology with Philos-
ophy and with the Natural Sciences. Participants: HUGO
MONSTERBERG, G. STANLEY HALL, FRANK THILLY, JAMES R.
ANGELL, A. E. TAYLOR, and WILHELM OSTWALD.
PROFESSOR MWNSTERBERG contended for the affiliation of psy-
chology with philosophy, as provided for by Emerson Hall. His
remarks will appear in the forthcoming second volume of the Harvard
Psychological Studies, as part of an essay under the title ' Emerson
Hall.'
PRESIDENT HALL. — The speaker took the opposite view from
Professor Miinsterberg and would withdraw psychology from philos-
ophy and affiliate it with the natural sciences, since, from his point of
view, psychology, provisionally defined, is " a description as accurate
as may be of all those facts of psychic life, conscious and unconscious,
animal and human, normal and morbid, embryonic and mature, which
are demonstrable and certain to be accepted by every intelligent
unbiased mind which fully knows them. They must also be so
ordered like to like, and organized, that they can all be known with
the least trouble. The best plan of organization when possible is evo-
lutionary." Under this definition, psychology is excluded from no
field of experience, conscious or unconscious, religious, social, genetic
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or individual, that can be studied on the basis of solid empirical data,
and hence its closest allies as an inductive science in the future must
be biology, physiology and anthropology. The nature of soul no
more concerns it than does the ultimate nature of matter and motion
concfern physics. Such discussions belong to philosophy, the history
of which the speaker would insist upon as a part of the training of
every experimentalist, but would avoid too prolonged a lingering in
the philosophical fields, lest it unfit for dealing with facts. Psychology
is yet in its dawn, and its striving should be toward the goal of becom-
ing a true natural history of the soul. (Taken from Amer. J. of
Psychol., XVII., 145. The remarks will be published in full in
Science.)
PROFESSOR THIIXY. — The fact that mind can be studied in con-
nection with matter does not make psychology a branch of natural
science. Psychology is interested in a unique body of facts, and a
perfect knowledge of their material antecedents would not give us a
knowledge of mind as such. The argument that physiological states
are the real things and brain knowledge the only scientific knowledge
rests on the questionable metaphysics of materialism. Even if it were
true, the psychologist would go right on studying the so-called effects
of brain states, for knowledge of brain motions would not tell the
whole story ; but our knowledge of what is going on in the brain does
not yet form a complete science. Besides, the brain physiologist can-
not take a step in the construction of his hypotheses without psychology.
If the psychical states could be deduced from their physiological
causes, the physiologist could ignore psychology, but there would still
remain a more direct way of studying mind for the psychologist.
The argument is also urged that the mental series does not form a
continuous line, that a closed causal nexus and hence science exists for
external nature only, and that to be scientific psychology must become
a natural science. We answer: More careful observation may dis-
close the missing links, and where this fails we can have recourse to
hypotheses. Besides, there are gaps in the physiological line also,
which are bridged over by theory. Finally, if psychology is im-
possible because of breaks in the mental causal series, cerebral physi-
ology is impossible for analogous reasons and because we then have no
key with which to open the secrets of the brain. The view that psy-
chology is a natural science because it employs the methods of science
is also untenable. The psychologist uses the objective methods but
introspection is everywhere his basis and guide. Experiment facili-
tates, corrects, and controls introspection. Measurement forms but a
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small and unimportant part of the problem. In conclusion, affiliation
with philosophy is in the interests of both fields. Psychology is indis-
pensable to the other philosophical studies, while the aims and prob-
lems peculiar to the latter help to give direction to the former. In-
terest in philosophical problems fixes attention on mental states, which
the scientist is apt to ignore because he can find no physical antece-
dents for the same, acts as a safeguard against a false mental atomism,
and tends to keep in view the unity of mind. The relation of psy-
chology to metaphysics is not to be conceived as an a priori con-
struction of the facts of psychology from metaphysical principles.
But if dependence on metaphysics means that psychology must start
out from some broad assumptions and must have recourse to hypothe-
ses in attempting to explain, then psychology depends on metaphysics.
There is no absolutely presuppositionless psychology.
PROFESSOR ANGEIX. — Ought psychology to continue indefinitely
its allegiance to philosophy or should it enroll its name under the ban-
ners of the natural sciences? Professor Miinsterberg has warmly
defended the first alternative. President Hall is no less fervent in his
espousal of the second. For my own part I refuse to recognize
either the necessity or the wisdom of taking any overt measures look-
ing toward the one step or the other. And the absence of such a
necessity I regard as eminently fortunate, for psychology is just be-
ginning to gain the respect of the scientists and she has not as yet
wholly lost that of the philosophers. • She is therefore in too delicate
a position gratuitously to alienate the sympathy and support of either
of these powerful allies.
As a matter of fact, apart from the question of the label by which
we shall classify psychology — and this is evidently a somewhat aca-
demic issue — I do not see how any serious divergence of opinion is
possible upon the point under consideration. That our Harvard
friends have put their psychological laboratory in this superb building
devoted also to philosophy does not raise in my mind the question as
to any impropriety in this cohabitation, but rather a sense of the grati-
fication which each party to the contract ought to feel in such admir-
able companionship and in such stately and appropriate quarters.
Certainly I should gladly accept for myself, were it offered, a labora-
tory so excellently appointed, even though my neighbors in the build-
ing were such psychological outcasts as lawyers or doctors. Mere
physical juxtaposition means little, unless it embodies an avowal of
spiritual dependence or affiliation which evidently is no necessary part
of it.
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In this particular instance, however, there is a high degree of
spiritual intimacy which must make the companionship of the con-
tracting parties extremely profitable to both. But this is by no means
to maintain or admit that this companionship is the only one congenial
and advantageous to them. Everyone knows that psychology has for
the most part a philosophical lineage, and that certain highly impor-
tant foundations of psychology, even when it is regarded as a natural
science, must always be of a philosophical character. Any proposi-
tion, therefore, permanently to estrange these two must be regarded not
only as ill-advised, but also as impracticable. On the other hand
everyone is equally well aware that in many of its methods and most
of its ideals modern psychology is approaching the position of the
sciences, and especially the biological sciences. Consequently, unless
one is ready to indict the whole spirit of the contemporary movement,
it seems imperative to countenance and encourage the most intelligent
appreciation by psychologists of those forms of scientific procedure
which they are likely to wish to appropriate. Such intelligent
familiarity they can only attain through intimate association with these
sciences.
The general intellectual poise which philosophical training affords
cannot be sacrificed by psychology without the most disastrous conse-
quences. But at the same time psychology just as surely needs the
invigorating contact of the natural sciences. Indeed, it does not seem
too much to claim that psychology has a peculiar mission at this pre-
cise juncture in the bringing together of the interests of philosophy
and natural science. Certainly no other science is in so strategic a
position for the accomplishment of this purpose.
PROFESSOR TAYLOR. — The affiliation of psychology appears to
be with the natural rather than with the philosophical sciences. It is
distinguished from the abstract philosophical sciences of formal logic
and mathematics by its dependence on empirical premises ultimately
based upon the testimony of direct perception, involving in their mean-
ings reference to a particular moment of time. In this respect it re-
sembles the empirical sciences of empirical nature. Nor do the
allegations that it deals only with the ' individual objects' and non-
quantitative processes afford a satisfactory basis for distinguishing it
from the natural sciences. It differs again from both the abstract and
concrete philosophical sciences (ethics, philosophy of religion, phi-
losophy of history, etc.) in making no use of the concept of ideal
norms of value.
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The Definition of Feeling. By HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.
The word 'feeling' is used in common speech to designate ( i )
touch, (2) the organic sensations, (3) emotion, (4) pleasure-pain, and
(5) mere emphatic experience as such. An examination of each of
these forms of our mental life shows that feeling can be identified
with no one of them.
A search for some emphatic characteristic of all the forms of ex-
perience in the description of which the word feeling is used by psy-
chologists leads us to see that we have such a characteristic in ' sub-
jectivity,' in the use of which word we express the fact that the mental
states thus referred to bear a close relation with the empirical ego.
This leads to the thesis that ' feeling proper' is a certain vague
mental form which when more clearly defined develops into the em-
pirical ego of self-consciousness. Feeling is thus the empirical ego
which has not yet become explicit. (This paper appeared in full in
the Journal of Philos., Psych., and Sci. Methods for January iS.)
The Definition of' Feeling.' By H. N. GARDINER.
Examination of the various derived meanings of the term ' feeling'
as commonly used shows a reference, in most cases, to an experience
analogous to certain features of tactile and bodily contact sensations,
namely, immediacy and intimacy of acquaintance, obscurity of content,
tentativeness in the movement towards more definite consciousness and
direct qualifying identification with self. A psychological use of the
term should keep as closely as possible in touch with the common
meaning. Hence it should not be applied exclusively to the pleasure-
pain and allied phases of consciousness, however general and impor-
tant. The usual definitions of feeling limiting it to such phases are
insufficient. ' Feeling' may be defined as the immediate conscious-
ness of the modification of individual experience as such; a feeling,
as the content of consciousness, however constituted, regarded as the
immediate modification of such experience. Primarily the self is
constituted of a felt manifold of qualitative differences, and such a
manifold, constantly changing, persists as the basis of the distinguish-
ing functions of the mental life. (This paper appeared in full in the
Journal of Philos., Pysch., and Sci. Methods for February 1, 1906.)
Discussion of the Two Preceding Papers.
JAMES R. ANGELL. — The desirability of a definition of feeling has
been especially felt by those called upon to teach psychology. It is
necessary to define feeling more or less arbitrarily. Subjective refer-
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ence must be the most important element in a definition. We should
be cautious with Mr. Marshall's ' empirical ego' because there is even
less agreement as to what it is than there is about feeling. Moreover,
it is difficult to distinguish subjective reference as an occasional cogni
tive function from subjectivity as an existential condition, as ' matter
of being,' in Ward's phrase. Nevertheless, if feeling is to have psy-
chological status emphasis must be placed on its subjective character,
and then we must proceed to explain precisely wherein this consists.
G. M. DUNCAN. — There would be a gain in accuracy and in
scientific progress by discarding the term ' feeling' altogether, as it,
like the terms ' consciousness,' ' perception' and ' sensation,' is
unsuited for use in a scientific terminology in consequence of its
many and popular connotations. If used, it seems especially unde-
sirable to give it the wide generic sense of ' thought' and 'idea,'
as those terms were employed by the Cartesians and by Locke,
respectively. ' Affection,' or ' affective psychosis,' was the meaning
(and term) preferred. Taking feeling in that sense, it was held
that imperfect psychological analysis or philosophical preconceptions
only could lead to identifying it with mere pleasure-pain. Our feel-
ings have, qua feelings, quality as well as intensity, and can be ar-
ranged along an ideal scale as higher and lower. Wundt's doctrine
of the tridimensional nature of feeling was criticised as lacking in sat-
isfactory evidence; the second and third elemental characteristics not
being regarded as feeling proper at all, but rather as effects or accom-
paniments, organic or mental, which are confounded with affective
states proper. Agreement was expressed with Marshall and Angell
in the emphasis laid upon the characteristic of ' subjectivity' as of
the essence of feeling; feeling being ' subjectively subjective.'
G*. STANLEY HALL. — Five years ago the speaker collected a great
number of definitions of feeling with a view to studying the question,
but laid them aside as being quite unprofitable. It is entirely delusive
to attempt to define feeling. Definitions are the last product of devel-
opment. The important thing is to collect illustrations of the emotions,
curves of interest, physiological reflexes, etymologies, studies of dic-
tionaries, histories, etc., and manifestations of feelings in animals.
Intellect was first studied by psychologists in detail, then came will, and
feeling is now on the docket. Knowledge and description of facts,
and above all development histories, are the best possible definition.
Words must not take the place of things. If feeling must be defined it
covers the whole of mental life. Consciousness, as in strong feeling, is
subordinate to feeling. Feeling is wider and older genetically than
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intellect or will, and in a sense is better, i. e., more immediately
known. To fall back on definitions is dangerous. Confession of
ignorance, that we know nothing about feeling, is best.
CHARLES H. JUDD Feeling is recognized as peculiarly subjec-
tive in character, and it is a common attribute of all mental states. It
is often described as vague.- This description is due to a wrong effort
to force feeling into the categories of cognition. A state may be
vague as cognition and yet be emphatic and distinct as feeling. Tak-
ing into account the subjectivity of feeling, its universality, and differ-
entiation from cognition, we are led to recognize the intimate relation
of feeling to the expressive side of mental life. Every mental state has
as one of its constituents an ' attitude.' This attitude is an expression
of the empirical ego; it is always present; it may have a clearness of
its own even when its grounds, or cognitive justifications, are vague.
If the word 'attitude' is freely used where 'feeling' occurs in psy-
chological discussions, the significance of this view will become
apparent.
MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN. —Feeling in its broad sense may
be defined as the unanalyzed and unlocalized part of consciousness.
We should distinguish between ( I ) processes that do not happen to be
analyzed or localized at a given moment, because not in the focus
of attention, as for example a name that one is trying to recall; (2)
processes that are not under ordinary circumstances analyzed or
localized, such as the mass of organic sensations making up emotion,
or the 'feeling' of effort; and (3) processes that ultimately resist all
analysis and localization. Under this third head belong the so-called
relational elements, vestiges of primitive motor attitudes, and pleasant-
ness-unpleasantness, corresponding to the positive and negative reac-
tions. Pain, being localized, should be classed under the head of sen-
sation rather than feeling. (Miss Washburn's remarks appeared in
full in the Journal of Philos., Psych., and Sd. Methods for Feb-
ruary 1, 1906.)
Attention and Interest. By W M . H. BURNHAM.
Attention is said to depend upon interest. It is equally true and
quite as important that interest depends upon attention. The word
interest, as everybody knows, is used in two senses: (1) as practically
all psychologists agree, it denotes a complex state of feeling; (2) it
denotes a permanent habit of preperception. Even in our standard
psychologies these two meanings are often confused. If the word in-
terest is used in the latter sense, to signify a permanent habit of pre-
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perception, nobody will deny that attention depends upon interest;
but this is merely saying that our present preperception depends upon
our past habits of preperception. If, however, by interest is meant
the affective state, there is no adequate justification for saying that
attention depends upon it. Attention is a reaction of the whole or-
ganism, comparable to the tropisms of plants and animals. We must
suppose an affective state correlated with this reaction. This affective
state is interest. The least we can assert is this correlation; the the-
ory here supported is that the feeling' of the organic adjustment in at-
tention is the interest. Stated in this way it is practically a corollary
from the Lange-James theory of emotion.
While with legitimate heedlessness we may continue to use the
popular phraseology in regard to attention and interest — just as we
say that the sun rises and sets — in our special psychology of attention
it is confusing to teach that attention depends upon interest. Not
only the popular but the psychological uses of the words interest and
attention are misleading survivals of an obsolete science; and in peda-
gogy this usage has led to great confusion and error.
Of course, any such account of the processes of attention and in-
terest does injustice to the complexity of the actually existing mental
states. The process of preperception determines not merely the as-
pects of an object to which we attend, but to a great extent the inten-
sity and coloring of the affective state, that is, the interest. That this
may occur in a short-circuited manner — the preperceptive images
being associated with affective states, or, if one prefer, they themselves
having an emotional coloring — there seems to be no reason to deny.
Excursive Attention. By J. P. HYLAN.
The tendency of recent researches which indicate the impossibility
of a simultaneously divided attention calls for the recognition of the
real nature of the phenomena that have been studied. This appears
to consist of the habit of rapidly shifting from one object to another,
and hence is made up of a series of successive acts. This wandering
or shifting of direction is different from concentration on the one hand
or mind-wandering on the other. Excursiveness is the term proposed
for it, and excursive attention to indicate the form of attention which
goes with it.
Not only the inability to divide the attention, but also the rapidity
of mental fatigue, makes excursiveness a necessity. This is especially
the case in perception. Evidence of this comes from a great variety
of experiments and also from the explanations of optical illusions and
from introspection.
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While in perception excursiveness is of a reflex type and appears
largely as an unconscious method in judgment and when trying to
keep track of a number of things at the same time, it is more often
conscious and voluntary. Almost any trade or active occupation illus-
trates this to a greater or less extent. It is especially prominent in
administrative work and the control of large business undertakings.
While the power of concentration of attention is a predominant aim
in mental training, excursive attention is no less essential to the needs
of practical life.
The Psychology of Organic Movements. By I. MADISON BENTLEY.
The psychologist's interest in organic movements depends, in large
measure, upon the systematic point of view from which he regards
consciousness. In order to avoid partisan bias and clearly to set forth
the essential relations obtaining between psychology and movement,
it is necessary to distinguish ' motor 'facts from ' motor' theories.
The factual relationships of movement and consciousness furnish
data common to all psychologies. These relationships may be indi-
cated by an enumeration of the specific problems into which move-
ment enters as a primary factor. The specific problems once stated
may be disposed of in either of two ways; they may be referred to,
and absorbed in, the general psychological system, or they may be
subsumed under some single, all-inclusive 'motor ' theory.
General motor theories are of two types; the first type emphasizes
the motor conditions, the second the motor consequences of conscious-
ness. Ribot's theory of attention and Miinsterberg's Aktionstheorie
are theories of the first type; while the biological trend, which ap-
pears in several varieties of ' functional' psychology, tends to en-
courage theories of the second type. A consideration of the psychol-
ogy of ' coordination' and ' adjustment' leads to the conviction that
the primary postulate of this psychology is a conscious activity which
may be identified with attention, and that this activity, as the chief
agency in the production of adaptive movements, stands in need of
careful definition and description.
Modified Causation for Psychology. By G. M. STRATTON.
The admission that two mental events or a mental event and a phy-
sical event are not parts of a continuous process and are not equivalent
in quantity, seems at first sight to settle the question as to a casual
connection between them. But we must remember that our idea of
cause, while in part a priori, is also in part empirical; and the em-
pirical elements in it have been derived mainly from our observation
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of physical objects. The idea of causation most serviceable in physics,
however, need not be the one best fitted for the study of the larger
world which includes both physical and mental events. Indeed, it
would seem well to make ' concomitant variation' our chief criterion
of causation here, and to back it with the other ' canons of induction,'
but not to require any quantitative equivalence or any kind of qualita-
tive continuity. Philosophy has never felt bound to regard physical
causation as the sole type of causation; and psychology may feel quite
as free.
Psychical Energy. By WILHEEM OSTWALD.
Since the time of Descartes matter and mind have been regarded
as utterly different parts of the world, extensity being the character-
istic property of matter and thinking that of mind.
Psychophysical parallelism appears to open the only possible way
of bringing the mental processes into relation with the corresponding
physicochemical or physiological processes in the nerves and the
brain, as long as one keeps to the assumption that these physicochemi-
cal processes are nothing but mechanical processes going on among
the atoms of the brain. This fundamental assumption of mechani-
cal materialism is generally taken for granted, and notable philoso-
phers have even endeavored to prove that it is the only possible as-
sumption for the understanding of the physical world. Only in
recent times has this assumption been criticized and turned out to be
nothing but an arbitrary hypothesis.
In the present state of our knowledge the only safe and sound
theory of the physical world is the energetical one. Every physical
fact can be described in terms of energy without the help of any arbi-
trary hypothesis; it is therefore possible to state the whole empirical
content of every physical fact or relation by describing the energies in-
volved as to their kind of magnitude.
As energy is by far the larger concept as compared with matter
and motion — electricity for example can not be described in terms of
the latter, while it can be described in terms of energy — it seems
possible to extend the concept of energy so far as to include mental
facts as well as physical ones. While psychical facts cannot be con-
sidered as mechanical ones, there seems to be no contradiction in con-
sidering them as produced by certain changes of energy. We are
justified already in assuming that the process going on upon excitation
along a nerve is an energetical one. What kind of energy is involved
we do not know; the slow rate of propagation disproves the electrical
nature of this process, which was assumed in former times. It may
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be a kind of energy of its own, or else a peculiar combination of
two or more energies. Now between unconscious nerve- and brain-
processes and conscious ones there is no sharp distinction; therefore
the inference is justified that there is no essential difference between
them as to their nature, i. e., that conscious mental processes also are
energetical ones.
To make this point clear, we will assume an ideal experiment.
Suppose we know exactly the amount of all the energies a human
body is built from, and record the quantity of each in every instant.
If then this human being starts a mental process, part of the chemical
energy of the brain would disappear as such, without appearing at
the same time in another known form; it would assume the state of
mental or psychical energy. When the mental process is stopped,
just this quantity of energy would appear in another form, probably as
heat.
Unless this experiment or an equivalent one is carried out, the
theory of psychical energy remains in the state of a protothesis, i. e.,
as a probable but still unproved inference from experimental facts.
As this theory is the only one which opens a way to connect the inner
and outer world by a functional relation, it has a distinct advantage
over the theory of psychophysical parallelism, which is no theory at
all, but only an arbitrary declaration that no such functional relation
exists.
Introductory Remarks on Cooperation. By CHARLES H. JUDD.
Such suggestions as are made in this paper are based on the con-
viction that each laboratory must determine its own problems and
methods of investigation. Within the limits thus set for cooperation
there are four directions in which it is profitable for the Association to
consider the possibility of more intimate relations between laboratories
and departments.
1. A committee of the Association might very profitably bring to-
gether information regarding apparatus. Many laboratories are pre-
pared to furnish certain pieces of apparatus but do not find it possible
to announce this fact extensively. Many new laboratories find it very
difficult to secure information regarding good apparatus.
2. The possibilities of cooperation in the publication of psycho-
logical results are by no means exhausted.
3. The interests of different psychologists could probably be better
served by dividing the Association meetings into small sections of psy-
chologists who would have more discussion of their particular papers
than is possible in the general Association meetings. The desirability
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of such separation of special interests is now manifesting itself in the
tendency of the experimentalists, for example, to have a separate ses-
sion during the spring recess.
4. It would be profitable for the Association to devote more time
at its regular meetings to the discussion of methods of instruction and
to the discussion of courses in the different phases of psychology.
A Sketch of a Beginner's Course in Psychology. By E. C. SAN-
FORD.
The form of the following course is determined by three consider-
ations: (1) The universally accepted pedagogical principle that one
must begin to build upon the foundation of such knowledge and inter-
ests as the pupil already possesses; (2) that a wide basis of general
acquaintance with psychological facts is essential to satisfactory prog-
ress; and (3) that a genuine interest in science for its own sake is a
late development in knowledge of any kind. The course should then
begin with what is not far removed from the habits of thought and the
practical interests of the pupil, and progress, with abundant contact
with concrete psychical facts, to those things that are of interest as
matters of pure science. Such a course might take up the following
topics in something like the following order:
1. Psychology of Learning and Acquisition : Memory (including
mnemonics) with its helps and hindrances ; habit; practice, acquisition
of manual skill and dexterity, learning of languages, and of complex
mental operations. (Attention, emotion, volition, fatigue, interest,
etc., to be treated incidentally as necessary.)
2. Psychology of Truth and Error: Illusions; prejudice ; supersti-
tion; delusion; Bacon's idola ; mob psychology; psychology of testi-
mony, of logical reasoning and the fallacies. Evolution of general
ideas, and origin and nature of belief.
3. Psychology of Emotion: Nature and laws of strong racial
emotions — fear, anger, and love; their biological purpose and their
hygiene. Psychological basis of aesthetics; the intellectual emotions.
Psychological basis of ethics.
4. Psychology of Personality and Character: Types of character;
temperament; the criminal, pauper, mystic, philistine, the natural
leader and born henchman. The formation and influence of ideals.
Psychology of the will; hygiene and diseases of the will.
5. Facts of the Interdependence of Mind and Body: The perma-
nent and the alterable in the human make-up, heredity and acquired
characters; the nature and evolution of instincts, the nervous system
(anatomical and physiological) as the basis of these. Hypnotism.
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Chief forms of nervous and mental disease. Neural and mental hy-
giene.
6. Psychogenesis: Biological view of mind and the history of
mind in the animal series. Human psychogenesis.
7. Brief review and systematization of the facts already presented:
Systematic psychology.
It is to be understood throughout that all these topics are to be
presented as concretely as possible, with demonstrations, class and in-
dividual experiments, introspections, guided and free, and whatever
other means may be possible.
In defense of such a program it may be said, first, that as every
mental process involves psychical factors of all kinds there is really no
natural order of presentation for the subject, and that in teaching the
pedagogical requirements should be determining; and, second, that the
average beginner in psychology knows enough of the meaning of
words to make such a mixed order of treatment possible. The purely
logical order often followed has advantages, but they are over-bal-
anced in the writer's opinion by the tendency to too great abstraction
in the beginning and by the necessary assumption of a theoretical and
genuinely scientific interest — something rarely present first and usu-
ally to be reached only at the end of a good course.
Discussion of the ttuo preceding papers,
E. A. KIRKPATRICK.—Regarding cooperation the speaker sug-
gested that the Council, when considering what shall be done with the
accumulated funds of the Association, should deliberate upon the ad-
visability of employing a paid secretary who, in addition to the usual
duties of a secretary, should undertake to organize a bureau of infor-
mation and exchange. In regard to the teaching of psychology, he
said that while none of us teach or justify the teaching of the dogmatic
psychology condemned by Miss Calkins, yet the result of our teaching
upon the minds of beginning students is often the same as if it were
dogmatic. Unknown to ourselves we are likely to thrust upon their
minds the mass of facts and general truths reached by psychologists
and expressed in technical terms, before the power to observe mental
processes and to think clearly about them has been developed. Even
the best students who have already done a good deal of observing in
what they call the study of 'human nature' often fail to recognize
familiar truths when arranged and named in the psychological classi-
fication and terminology. We have had the ideal course described by
Dr. Sanford this year. Let us next year have a conference and re-
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port what we have actually done in teaching beginners psychology
during the year and the results.
HERBERT G. LORD. — The speaker contended that, in both the
subject matter and method of teaching the elements of psychology, the
tendency was to be unconscious of the ignorance and mental confusion
of the beginner. The instructor's very familiarity with the subject
was his misfortune. He knew too much and talked over the heads of
most of his students. The ideal text-book could be written and taught
by a man whose youth was not dead and buried. This condition of
mind of the beginner rendered the lecture method of instruction the
very worst conceivable.
WALTER T. MARVIN. — The speaker agreed with Professor San-
ford's paper as presenting an ideal, especially in the way of subject
matter, though one hardly realizable. The chief problem in any
course is: What precisely does the teacher wish the student to learn,
as distinguished from all the illustration, exposition, etc., that maybe
found helpful? In short, every course should include a body of defi-
nite and precise information to be thoroughly learned, hard as it may
be to secure such information in psychology as compared with the
exact sciences.
We cannot educate general functions, but perhaps one of the special
habits we can form in the brightest pupils is reading interesting books
on psychology. This might be possible, especially under the precep-
torial system at Princeton or some similar system.
C. E. SEASHORE. — The speaker called attention to the fact that
one may see three distinct theories in regard to the place of experiment
in elementary courses embodied in the construction of laboratories at
the present time. In making provision for the first-year students some
laboratories provide large lecture rooms seating two or three hundred
students, others provide moderate-sized lecture rooms seating from
thirty to fifty, and still others provide small rooms or booths for the
accommodation of the individual experimenter. The first and the
third are undesirable : the failure of the large class lecture is notorious,
and first year students cannot profitably pursue the individual experi-
ment. Experimental demonstrations should be used very freely with
the beginning students in moderate sections such that each student can
follow the experiment, question, or be questioned. A three-hour
course throughout the first year may well be devoted to the teaching
of facts, richly illustrated and applied; the individual laboratory
course may be reserved for those who desire technical training, which
will not be more than one tenth of the beginning class.
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S. I. FRANZ. — The speaker remarked that in his opinion under
present conditions there could be little cooperation between the labora-
tories in universities and in insane hospitals. If, however, more psy-
chologists appreciated the importance of and showed interest in the
mentally abnormal, more helpful relations would be brought about.
The hospitals are primarily for the care and treatment of patients and
secondarily for research and education. The hospitals cannot well
take up the teaching function, but many institutions are willing to grant
to well-trained workers opportunities for investigating the mental con-
dition of the insane and the feeble-minded. The opinion was ex-
pressed that much of value to normal psychology could be obtained
if more attention was devoted to these mental conditions, which
are principally exaggerations and diminutions of normal functions.
Casual visits to insane hospitals, however, do not give an adequate idea
of the material or its value. A period of time corresponding to a
university semester could be profitably spent by students of psychology
in the study of the insane or feeble-minded. Such a period of time
would be sufficient for the psychological investigator to obtain an in-
sight into the problems and the material, and the hospital would be
repaid by the research which could be accomplished.
R. S. WOODWORTH.— Cooperation is perhaps most needed in the
way of mutual criticism. Published results in psychology often re-
main for years neither generally accepted nor rejected, because they
are not critically threshed out nor experimentally tested by other psy-
chologists. Our standard of productive work would be raised by
giving serious and critical attention to each other's results.
In the usual introductory course of psychology, the student is re-
ferred mostly to his own experience for data. He is not taught new
facts so much as a new point of view. It is at least worth considering
whether a course could not be arranged which should — as in the other
sciences — present him with facts entirely new to him. The great diffi-
culty with such a course would be the selection of really valuable facts;
the more recent literature is richer in such facts than the older literature
on which most text-books are based. It would also be difficult to make
the course systematic. It should, without doubt, be an experimental
course with laboratory work.
EDWARD COWLES. — Mental physiology is essential to mental
pathology, and psychology would be greatly aided by the study of
functional modifications under pathological conditions. The insanities
can be studied to advantage only in hospitals for the insane; the pos-
sibility of cooperation between these institutions and the teaching of
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psychology depends much upon what is wanted. The general demon-
strations of a hospital clinic to a class can be given usefully and as
practicably to psychological students as to medical students; compara-
tively few of the latter get more than that under the present condi-
tions of teaching psychiatry. It would depend upon such a clinic be-
ing available near enough to a college. The difficulties include the
want of time and interest of busy institution officers in the specially
psychological aspects of the cases. As far as research in psycho-
logical problems is concerned little can be accomplished except in
a hospital where a laboratory for psychological experiment is pro-
vided, and actual clinical work is being conducted by a competent in-
vestigator. Under such circumstances a student having the privileges
of a period of residence, or of daily observation, might profitably un-
dertake the work of special research. Such circumstances are so ex-
ceedingly rare that I know of only one place in this country, and of
that Dr. Franz has just spoken. The hope is that the value of such
laboratory work in its immediate service to the patients will become
appreciated. This is already apparent enough as a matter of fact;
and it is hopeful that hospital authorities can find a reason for grant-
ing such privileges in the fact that it is a benefit to the institution to
have such contributions of research work to its own service.
ADOLF MEYER. — The speaker regretted that courses in psycho-
pathology, in their cooperation with hospitals for the insane, unfortu-
nately follow as a rule the scheme of filling the students with a collec-
tion of the most clean-cut pictures from the literature, and then use a
demonstration of actual cases in hospitals merely as an illustration.
This scholastic method does more harm than good, and it is urgently
desirable that students should become more familiar with the actually
accessible facts of observation and less intoxicated with abstract pres-
entation of the attractive unusual. Courses in psychology as usually
given form a very inadequate preparation for work in psychopathology.
Dr. Sanford's plan would more adequately meet the needs than the
very dogmatic laboratory psychology which spends such an excessive
amount of time on the study of sensations that it is forced to exclude
the study of the development of instincts, which would form a much
more adequate avenue to the study of psychopathology.
(Remarks were also made by E. B. Delabarre, E. A. McC. Gam-
ble, Robert MacDougall, E. L. Thorndike, the president and
others.)
The Doctrine of Specific Energies. By C. LADD FRANKLIN.
(Read by title.)
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The Possibility of Retinal Local Signs of the Third Dimension.
By W. P. MONTAGUE. (Read by title.)
The Color Sense of Young Children. By W. S. MONROE.
Four hundred children between the ages of three and six years
were tested with the spectrum colors along the four lines: (1) ability
to match colors; (2) ability to name colors; (3) color liked best;
and (4) favorite color combinations. Sex differences were not pro-
nounced, although the girls matched and named colors slightly better
than the boys. Ability to match and name colors increased with
years. Red was at all ages and with both sexes oftenest matched and
named correctly, and blue ranked second. Orange and violet were
least often perceived and named correctly. Red was the favorite
color, blue second, violet third. Red was most often used in color
combinations and blue came second. Green was most frequently
matched, named and used in color combinations by the children of
Irish parentage. Ability to name colors correctly lags much behind
the ability to match colors correctly. Standard colors are generally
preferred to shades and tints. Black and white are probably known
much better and much earlier than the spectrum colors. There are
marked individual differences in the ability of young children to name
and perceive the spectrum colors.
Primitive Color Names and the Primary Colors. By J. W.
BAIRD.
Philologists have found that many of the languages of antiquity
are characterized by a poverty and indefiniteness of color-vocabulary.
They have found too that in numerous instances names for red and
yellow were evolved at an earlier period than names for green and
blue. Anthropologists report that certain primitive races of the pres-
ent day possess a normal (European) sensitivity to red and yellow
but a subnormal sensitivity to green and blue. Certain observations
upon' children are said to have yielded a similar result. And archeol-
ogists have discovered that the sculptors of antiquity made ludicrous
blunders in their use of blue pigments, while red and yellow pigments
were applied appropriately.
From this mass of evidence two general conclusions have been
drawn: (a) The color sense is of comparatively recent acquisition.
It was wholly lacking in our early human ancestors; even so late as
the Homeric age man was totally color-blind; (£) The evolution of
the color sense has followed the spectral order—from red through yel-
low and green to blue.
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There is reason to believe that both these conclusions are erro-
neous. (1) The philological argument is based upon the untenable
assumption that the development of color names has always and
everywhere kept pace with the development of color sensitivity. (2)
It seems incredible that a function so highly differentiated as the color
sense could have been evolved in the course of a hundred generations
(Homer to the present). (3) Moreover, the fact that many of the
lower animals seem to be able to distinguish colors makes it seem im-
probable that any race of mankind, however primitive, was totally
color-blind. (4) The archeological argument loses its force unless
one grant that artists have always aimed to make facsimile copies of
their originals. Moreover, archeological remains (Persian and Egyp-
tian) show that green and blue pigments were correctly employed at
a pre-Greek period.
It seems probable that the colors of the red end of the spectrum
were named at an earlier period than those of the blue end, but this
does not necessarily imply that our color sensitivity has followed the
spectral order in its development. (5) The fact that blue pigments
were relatively inaccessible to primitive man undoubtedly had its in-
fluence upon the evolution of a color terminology. (6) The rela-
tively late appearance of names for green and blue may be referred to
a lack of interest in these colors — a lack which is common to primi-
tive races and children. (7) The fact that dark-skinned races are
relatively insensitive to (green and to) blue may be explained in terms
of a deeper macular pigmentation (c/". tests of indirect vision, Vir-
chow, Rivers) and not at all in terms of an absence from the retina of
blue-sensing substance. Indeed, certain very primitive peoples are
not less sensitive to blue than to red (Woodworth).
The phenomena of indirect vision clearly indicate that the color
senses were evolved in pairs, and in the following order: first black
and white, subsequently yellow and blue, and finally red and green.
This view is supported by the circumstances (a) that the zones of
color sensitivity have a paired arrangement upon the retina, (3) that
the black-white substance has the widest, and the red-green substance
the least wide retinal distribution, and (c) that the red-green substance
is most readily fatigued while the black-white substance possesses the
greatest tenacity of function. Our view is also supported by the fact
(a?) that in case of atavism of the color sense (color-blindness) the
red-green function is the first to be lost. It is further confirmed by
(e) the order of disappearance of the color zones in hysteria and in
progressive atrophy of the optic nerve.
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A Study of After-images on the Peripheral Retina. By HELEN
B. THOMPSON and KATE GORDON. (Read by Miss Gordon.)
Experiments were made upon the peripheral retina of the light-
adapted eye. Nine pigment colors served as stimuli. The after-
images of these colors were cast upon backgrounds of varying bright-
ness. It was found that: (a) The color-tone of an after-image is
modified by the brightness of the background upon which it is thrown.
Upon a dark ground the darker color-element is emphasized, and upon
a light ground the lighter color-element. Thus a carmine after-
image looks bluish-carmine on a dark-gray ground, but reddish-car-
mine on a light-gray ground. (6) A dark ground tends to bring out the
stimulus color, but to suppress the after-image; whereas a light ground
tends to suppress the stimulus color, but to bring out the after-image.
It is possible for a subliminal color stimulus to produce a supraliminal
after-image of appropriate color-tone; a carmine seen as gray pro-
duces at times a distinct green after-image, and a green seen as gray a
carmine after-image, (c) Finer discriminations were made in the red-
yellow end of the spectrum than in the blue-green end, both in stimu-
lus and in after-image, for, ( i) on the part of the retina where the
stimuli red, orange and yellow were distinguished from one another
their after-images were not differentiated, i. e., each of these three
colors produced pure blue after-images, and (2) on a part of the retina
where the stimuli green-blue, blue and violet were not distinguished
from one another, but all appeared blue, the after-images to these
colors were differentiated, being respectively orange-red, orange and
greenish-yellow.
Visual Adaptation in Tachistoscopic Experimentation. By JOHN
A. BERGSTROM. (Read by title.)
The apparatus employed in these experiments is a new type of
tachistoscope, essentially like one figured and described by the writer
in the Indiana University Book, pp. 94—951 1904. In experiments
with the apparatus, the preparatory adaptation, or the lack of it, may
be of several kinds, most of which permit quantitative variation. An
experiment consisted of ascertaining what variation would be produced
in the apprehension and reproduction of a series of eight or nine letters
under any one of a number of specified experimental conditions.
Discrimination of letters is not a very sensitive measure of the
degree of adaptation; they can, of course, be read in light of very dif-
ferent degrees of intensity, so that considerable changes in brightness
might occur and be noticed without corresponding changes in the
record appearing. In general, adaptation by means of the translucent
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screen with a brightness somewhat below that of the flash (io<r) seemed
best and gave the best records. While there would be some error from
unfavorable conditions of adaption in tachistoscopic experimentation,
my impression is that so much can be effected by training that the error
from this source would not be so great as some critics of such work
seem to assume from observation of the effects of adaptation in every-
day experience or in the usual laboratory experiments.
Photographic Studies of Convergence. By C. H. JUDD.
The investigations reported in this paper were made by the photo-
graphic method described in the Tale Psychological Studies, Vol. I,
pp. 1-20. The eyes of two observers were photographed during
movements of convergence and divergence. In no case studied did
the two eyes make movements of convergence at the same rate. One
eye regularly moved more rapidly than the other, the differences in
time being on the average the difference between 260 sigmas for the
rapid movement and 400 sigmas for the slower. In divergence the
difference in the rate of movement in the two eyes was not so marked.
Very often the eye which converged more slowly made a sympathetic
lateral movement corresponding in direction to the movement of the
eye which moved rapidly. This tendency to sympathize was very
marked when the line along which the fixated points were placed coin-
cided with the line of fixation of one of the eves.
These facts show that even in fully developed adult convergence the
movement is not wholly automatic and independent of the retinal
images which arise during movement.
On the Influence of Reflex Stimulations to Eye-movement upon
Judgments of Number. By ROBERT MACDOUGALL.
This investigation sought to trace in our numerical judgments the
influence of the varying system of stimuli to reflex eye-movements
which the visual field presents, in a way analogous to the effect which
these stimuli exert upon our judgments of distance and quantity.
The materials consisted of twenty to thirty scraps of black and
colored paper scattered over a constant area, judgment was given in
terms of a comparative estimate of two groups simultaneously pre-
sented, one of which was arranged with a view to produce a greater
reflex stimulus than the other. A series of such comparisons was
made, involving brilliancy of coloring, contrast with background,
focalization and oscillation of vision by points de repere, comparison
of horizontal and vertical eye-movements, etc.
The observer's estimation of the number of objects presented
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seemed throughout to be affected by such arrangements, but no quanti-
tative comparison of the influence of the various factors introduced
was feasible under the methods adopted.
Vision during Dizziness. By EDWIN B. HOLT.
The stimulation of the semi-circular canals produced by rotation
of the head and body, results in a nystagmus of the eyes. The direc-
tion of these eye movements depends on the position of the head dur-
ing the rotation, i. e., the canal that is most effectively stimulated. In
every case this direction lies in a plane normal to the axis of rotation.
The nystagmatic movements (back and forth) are always such that the
movement is slow in one direction, more rapid in the other. The
rapid movements can be voluntarily inhibited, the slow cannot; that
is, the eyes can be held still on the side toward which the slow move-
ments bring them, but not on the other side. Both eyes-move together
and similarly. (These movements are illustrated by photographs of
the eyes during the dizziness produced by rotation with the head held
vertical. Speed and the extent of the two kinds of movement
measured.)
Now the rapid movements allow no visual sensations to reach con-
sciousness, while the slow do so allow them — as is shown by the after-
image streaks observable by the subject, from a luminous point that
moves (during the dizziness) at right angles to the direction of the
dizzy eye-movements, and on a black field. This explains why in
dizziness the visual field swims in one direction only, and not in the
other, i. e., why the field does not seem to swim to and fro. This
fact is further verified by the behavior in consciousness of a lasting
after-image generated on the eyes before rotation, and observed by the
subject as to its appearance during and after this rotation. I find no
mention of these facts in the literature, save for a paragraph of Delage
and a parenthetical reference by Mach. Both authors have given
merely their passing attention to the matter.
The nystagmatic movements are entirely consistent with Breuer's
theory of the function of the semi-circular canals (which is likewise that
of Mach). The rapid movements have several resemblances with
those of Professor Dodge's first type; the slow ones, though belonging
in that author's fourth type, yet have some features in common with
those of the second type. The rapid movements, owing to ' important
central factors,' occasion or occur concomitantly with a central anaes-
thesia.
Vision and Localization during Eye Movements. By R. S.
WOOD WORTH.
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Vision with the rapidly moving eye (t. e., during movements of
Dodge's l simple reaction type,' which I shall call ' eye jumps' for
short) does not differ essentially from vision with the resting eye, or
with the eye which is making a ' pursuit movement' — given only the
same retinal stimulation in the three cases. The evidence for this
statement is as follows:
1. In reference to the mirror experiment of Dodge, in which the
eye tries to see its own motion, the result is inconclusive, because the
moving eye could only be seen in indirect vision anyway, and because
what would be expected from the conditions of retinal stimulation in
this case is not clear vision of a moving eye, but a blurred image.
2. When the field of regard during an eye-jump encounters an ob-
ject moving in the same direction and at the same speed, the object is
clearly seen, as would be expected from the conditions of retinal stimu-
lation. That this appearance is not an after-image coming to con-
sciousness at the close of the movement is proved by the fact that it is
correctly localized in space, and not projected on the background at
the new fixation point, as an after-image would be. Also, the reac-
tion time to an object so seen is not long enough to include any con-
siderable period (.1 sec.) of anesthesia or central inhibition.
3. When a dark field presents one luminous spot, the spot is seen
to jump counter to the jump of the eye, leaving behind a bright streak
(the ' false streak ' of Holt) ; after the lapse of the usual latent period,
a fainter after-image streak is also seen. All this is exactly as would
be expected from the conditions of retinal stimulation, and can be
duplicated by moving the field past the fixed eye (most conveniently
by aid of a mirror). The 'false localization' of the bright streak is
simply a recognition of the direction of movement along the retina.
The fact that the apparent extent of the spot's movement (length of the
' false streak') is less than the distance between the old and the new
fixation points may be interpreted as analogous to the general inaccu-
racy of comparison of (angular) retinal magnitudes with the magni-
tudes of known objects in space. There are several details in the
' falsely localized after-image ' experiment which cannot be explained
by Holt's hypothesis; e. g., when a bright spot is presented only
during the middle of the eye jump, still both streaks are seen, and the
apparent motion of the spot is in evidence; yet this is the period of
the supposed anesthesia which cuts short the ' false streak.'
4. When the field presents no great contrasts of brightness, as in
ordinary conditions, its appearance during an eye jump can once more
be duplicated by moving the field while fixing the eye. An object
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presented only during the movement of the field often escapes obser-
vation entirelv- After practice, fusion, flicker, and apparent back-
ward movement can all be seen during eye jumps. Entoptic specks
and after-images can also be seen.
A Simple Method of Measuring Relationships. By E. L. THORN-
DIKE. (Read by title.)
Growth of Vocabularies. By E. A. KIRKPATRICK.
A preliminary report of an incomplete study of the size of vocab-
ularies of pupils from the second grade to the university. The method
used was that of having a hundred words (taken by chance from the
dictionary) marked as known, unknown or doubtful. The results so
far as tabulated indicate that the understanding vocabulary of any per-
son may thus be estimated with a fair degree of accuracy and that
those who read much possess larger vocabularies than those who do
not. It also appears probable that such a test associated with a defini-
tion of some of the words may be a ready and fairly accurate means of
estimating the general intelligence of pupils.
Training in Singing by aid of the Voice Tonoscope. By C. E.
SEASHORE.
The speaker described certain recent improvements in the tono-
scope, namely, the driving and control of speed by means of a syn-
chronous motor, using a metal drum with siren holes, producing the
standard tone directly from the drum and producing a tone of any
vibration frequency within an octave by means of a selenium cell.
He then stated some results of a series of experiments made by a stu-
dent, Mr. E. A. Jenner, showing that training for accuracj' in control
of the pitch of the voice in singing ( i ) progresses much more rapidly,
and (2) may reach a higher degree of efficiency in training by the aid
of the tonoscope than in training without it. The tonoscope reveals
to the singer the nature and the amount of the error of a tone to a very
much finer degree than the ear can hear. Incidentally a measure of
the relative difficulty of the intervals, the major third, the fifth and the
octave, was obtained and it was demonstrated that, for the purpose of
reproduction, these steps are approximately equal. It was also dem-
onstrated that the least producible change in the pitch of the voice, in
different parts of an octave within the middle range, is a constant
fraction of a tone.
Linguistic Lapses. By FREDERIC LYMAN W E L L S .
Linguistic lapses are always involuntary, central, not necessarily
conscious, and referable to a physiological basis. Their five general
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types are the assimilation, the dissimilation, the omission, the substi-
tution, and the metathesis. The first, fourth, and fifth of these are
generally dependent upon associative processes. The similarity of
the motor and sensory lapses is only superficial. The study of lapses
substantiates the view of individual localization for individual motor
linguistic elements. In the sensory lapse the mnemonic factor is
paramount. Metatheses are due to the weak memory for the time of
events compared to that of the events themselves. The most favorable
condition for both progressive and regressive sensory assimilation is a
poorly perceived stimulus followed by a well perceived one. There
is unconscious predisposition to certain classes of sensation in all
subjects.
Comparison of the Maximum Rates of Actual and of Imagined
Voluntary Rhythmic Muscular Movement. By CHARLES T.
BURNETT.
The movements in question were made with the finger, the hand,
the forearm, the arm, and the leg, the latter rotating at the hip. The
rhythmic movements consisted of a series of back-and-forth move-
ments through a fixed arc. The type of imagination at first employed
was kinesthetic. The experiments, which were carried out with a
single subject, the experimenter, and which must therefore be regarded
as tentative, show that the maximum rate of imagined rhythmic
movement is in most cases far smaller, and in all cases definitely
smaller, than the maximum rate of the corresponding actual move-
ment. Increase in rate occurred with practice, and in all but one
limb to a greater extent with the imagined than with the actual.
The average variation for actual movements is greater than for
imagined, and the variation among themselves of the several kinds of
actual movement is ten times as great as of the several kinds of im-
agined movement. It appears, therefore, that the maximum rate of
imagined movement is not determined by differences in the limbs,
when the imagination is of the kinesthetic type; and that, further, the
motor cue cannot be furnished by such imagination. Similar experi-
ments carried out with the visual type of imagination show marked
increase in rate, but are not yet as great as the highest rates for actual
movement.
In the search for a field where the maximum rate of imagined
movement should be equal to that of actual movement, eye and breath-
ing movements were tried with the same result. The speed of audi-
tory imagination was also tested with series made up in one case of
the syllables tut-tut-tut- etc., and in another of the alternating sounds
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of inhalation and exhalation; but this showed in its turn a failure to
give a rate as rapid as that of the actual limb movements. The same
was true of a series of touches imagined as stimulating in alternation
the volar and the dorsal sides of the finger. The conclusion seems
justified that in the limited field of movement under consideration the
classical theory of volition does not hold.
Experiments in which the arc of imagined movement was a maxi-
mum indicated that this factor has an important effect in showing the
maximum, etc.
A New Kymograph. By J. P. HYLAN.
This kymograph is designed to solve the difficulty of those who
need a first-class machine but have not the funds to secure one of the
Ludwig type. It consists of parts which are found ready-made in the
market and can be put together by one of ordinary mechanical ability.
The drum is 9 X 63^ inches and can be placed in a vertical or hori-
zontal position. It is turned by an electric motor whose rate is reduced
by worm gears and spur gears. By varying the combinations of these
and also the resistance in the electric current a great variety of rates
can be secured. A spiral record can be taken on the 'drum by means
of a carriage which moves the marking apparatus automatically.
Investigations on Rhythm, Time and Tempo. By J. E. W.
WALLIN.
I. Qualitative Limens or Grades of Rhythm: the JPsychophysics
of Variation.
This is a residual problem from the author's earlier research
(Rhythm of Speech, 1902, p. 69). How much may a rhythmical
interval be varied without affecting the rhythm ? What is the form of
the rhythm curve; how can it be psychophysically formulated?
The tone from a resonator passed through deep and less deep
holes in a regularly revolving disc, the sounds being heard through a
tube by the subject in a distant room at a rate of (a) 1.075 sec. and
(<5) 0.57 sec, both as trochees and as iambs, both in a continuous
series of eighteen beats and in a discontinuous series with every six
beats alternately silent and alternately sounding. The last weak beat
in each round of the disc was varied progressively by minimal steps,
and the subjects (ten) reported on the effect of this variation upon the
quality of the rhythm.
The most important results are: (1) The quality of rhythm may
be graded according to the degree of regularity into about five groups.
The corresponding qualities may be designated as perfect rhythm,
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good (shaky), fairly good, bad, and destroyed. (2) We may speak
of these grades as rhythm limens, the number of limens for a rhythm
corresponding to the number of steps between a perfect and disrupted
rhythm. These difference limens are not sharp lines but rather broad
thresholds. (3) The ranges between the limens are shorter. These
interlimen spans are not gaps in the rhythm curve. We may think of
them as corresponding to the spaces between the successive sensation
steps in the Weber-Fechner logarithmic curve of sensation. (4) The
rhythm limens follow the Weber-Fechner psychophysical law. The
qualitative grades vary as the stimulus irregularity changes by a pro-
portion of Yi of itself. This, then, furnishes the first application of
the psychophysical law to the field of aesthetics.
II. The Difference Limen in the Perception of Time.
This was ascertained in connection with the preceding experiment.
(1) It was invariably finer than the first rhythm limen (grade I.),
due partly to the fact that the rhythm limen is a range while the time
limen is a line; it stops short the moment the difference is perceived.
But a difference in time is perceived before a change in the grade of
the rhythm. (2) The limen is relatively finer for the longer interval,
for the continuous method and for the trochee pattern ( — ^ ) . (3)
Its average size is 5.2 per cent, of the intervals.
III. The Preferred Tempo.
A. The preferred tempo in a method of paired comparison of
metronome clicks. Twenty subjects listened to pairs of rates which
always started with the extremes in the series (208 and 40). The
preferred rate was repeated as long as it was preferred and compared
with the next faster or slower as the case might be. The rates ap-
proached closer and closer with each successive trial, either toward
the center of the pendulum or toward one of the ends. Thirty rates
were compared and detailed introspection recorded on a number of
points. Among the results may be mentioned: (1) The preferred
tempos for all subjects averaged .519 sec, or about half a second.
The median is somewhat higher, .579 sec. (2) The preferences for
the different subjects can be arranged in four groups, slow, medium,
fast and rapid; 1.169, .618, .435 and .319 sec. Half the results fall
within the second group, the tempo of which approximates some of
the earlier results. (3) The rate of the tempo preferred is inde-
pendent of whether or not the subject is musical. It will depend upon
numerous factors differing with the individual. (4) Nearly all sub-
jectively rhythmized the clicks; but the rhythm was felt to be a pale
affair as compared with the rhythm of music, notably the rhythm of
the drum. The problem should be studied with rhythm at its best.
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B. The preferred tempo as measured by a method of expression.
For this purpose the motor responses of the gallery furnish the best
material. To what rhythmical rates in the vocal and instrumental
music and dancing in the theatre do the unsophisticated youths respond
by stamping their feet most heartily and spontaneously ? The strength
of these responses can be grouped by the ear into four or five classes,
and the average time for the tempo in each group calculated. (Partly
finished.)
IV. The Maximum Number of Categories of Tempos.
The investigation is confined to the range set by the metronome.
Into how many classes, groups or categories can this series of speeds
be divided? What is the range of each category? (In progress.)
An Experimental Study in the Psychology of Voting. By COLIN
A. SCOTT. (Read by title.)
Sex Differentiation in the Sense of Time. By ROBERT MAC-
DOUGALL. (Readby title.)
Some Psychological Aspects of Success. By BROTHER CHRYSOSTOM.
(Read by title.)
The paper was suggested by current strictures on the average col-
lege student of our day, and by Wilbur F . Craft's ' Successful Men
of To-Day and What They Say of Success.' The deductions of the
latter work are based on replies to a questionnaire. From these re-
turns it appears ( i ) that a country farm is the best birthplace, as it
favors a more extended exercise of the senses, and a better training in
powers of observation (Professor Cattell's higher city birth-rate for
scientific men being probably accounted for by the fact that their early
education was given according to strictly scientific principles) ; (2) that
the plastic period of education should be largely directed to acquiring a
power of sustained observation and fixed attention, a condition often
brought about by the necessity of working for one's living; (3) that
the forming of a noble ideal of conduct and character is necessary both
to strengthen the will and to offset the effects of unfavorable environ-
ment ; (4) that therefore a systematic course of reflective reading is to
be commended as helping to a conviction of one's ability to succeed,
while cursory skimming over the average newspaper is to be depre-
cated as dissipating organized thought and concentration of mind; (5)
that the selection of maxims or watchwords summing up the results
of experience and reflection, if followed by frequent advertence to
them during the day, tends to freshen mental vigor and increase per-
sonal courage; (6) that among the most valuable assets in the en-
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. 75
deavor to attain success is the art of profiting by one's failures, an art
to be acquired rather by intensity of application than by distribu-
tion of energy. In a word, singleness of purpose is a prime requisite
for useful observation, which in turn generates interest, a condition of
concentration of mind.
Early American Psychology. By I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY. (Read
by title.)
Early American psychology was developed chief!}' among the
materialists in the middle and southern colonies. Foremost was Cad-
wallader Colden {First Principles of Action in Matter [1751], an
unpublished treatise entitled Principles of Morality [date?], Intro-
duction to the Study of Physics [1756 ?], Enquiry into the Principles
of Vital Alotion [1766], and Reflections [1770 ?] ). As a materialist,
Colden reduced psychology to a physiology of the nerves and was
precursory to the coming French sensationalism. Thus Thomas Jef-
ferson wrote to Cabanis in 1S03 that thought is a faculty of our material
organization. In the end, however, he preferred the intuitional real-
ism of his friend Dugald Stewart and argued at length in defence of
the instinctive impulses of the common-sense school.
Most significant of the native materialistic works was Joseph
Buchanan's Philosophy of Human Nature (Richmond, Ky., 1812).
In his attack on the faculty school Buchanan resembles another south-
ern physician, Thomas Cooper, whose translation of Broussais on
Insatiity and Irritation had as appendix a Defence of Materialism
and an Outline of the Association of Ideas (Charleston, S. C , 1831).
Belonging not to the ideologists but to the physiologists, Cooper reduces
ideas, of whatever kind, to motions excited in the brain and there felt
or perceived—judgment, reasoning, reflection being not distinct entities
but particular states or functions of the cerebral mass. The crass
objectivism of this early no-soul psychology led to the transcendental
reaction toward subjectivism and the belief in the Emersonian over-
soul.
